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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, intellectual property law has paid increas-
ing attention to issues of private international law.  The
problems involved in determining such issues as jurisdiction
and choice of law have prompted at least two organizations to
formulate general principles governing multi-state disputes.
The American Law Institute (ALI) promulgated Intellectual
Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judg-
ments in Transnational Disputes in 2008.1  In Europe, the Max
Planck Institutes’ Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP)
effort is expected in 2011.2  Although these projects deal with
most private international law issues arising in international in-
tellectual property litigation, neither has dealt explicitly with
choice of law on contributory liability (or any other form of
secondary liability that makes one party liable for the harm
caused by another).3  Yet, actions premised on secondary lia-
1. AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURIS-
DICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES
(2008) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
2. EUROPEAN MAX-PLANCK GROUP FOR CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLEC-
TUAL PROP., PRINCIPLES FOR CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
[hereinafter CLIP] (forthcoming 2011). The first preliminary draft is availa-
ble at http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/draft-clip-principles-08-04-
2009.pdf.  There are also parallel projects ongoing in Korea and Japan.
3. Addressing questions of choice of law in cases of secondary liability
runs headlong into what conflicts scholars would call the challenge of char-
acterization (or, in some countries, “qualification”): when does a case in-
volve “secondary liability”?  This is an ever-present dilemma for private inter-
national law.  But it is particularly acute in this context.  Different countries
use a variety of labels to denominate the different forms of secondary liabil-
ity that exist.  Indeed, courts in some countries do not characterize potential
liability as “secondary,” but rather talk of liability flowing directly from a fail-
ure to do certain acts (such as implement measures or engage in monitoring
or supervision). See, e.g., LVMH v. eBay, Tribunal de commerce [T.C.P.]
[court of trade] Paris, June 30, 2008, 11-12, (Fr.) available at http://web20.
nixonpeabody.com/np20/np20wiki/PDF%20Library/Ebay1.pdf.; cf. LVMH
v. Google, [cite] (Advocate-General Maduro, Sept. 22, 2009) (noting poten-
tial basis of intermediaries under national law).  Moreover, even within coun-
tries, semantics can obscure understanding in this area. See Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,435 (1984) (quoting
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 457-
458 (C.D. Cal. 1979)) (“[T]he lines between direct infringement, contribu-
tory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn.”); Thomas C.
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bility are rapidly becoming the favored route for efficient en-
forcement.  These actions permit rights holders to focus their
attention on “deep pockets,” save them the trouble of suing
individual end-users (who may also happen to be their custom-
ers), and can provide a simple mechanism for obtaining world-
wide injunctive relief.  Examples include cases that attempt to
impose liability on manufacturers of copying technologies for
infringements caused by those who use their equipment, on
purveyors of peer-to-peer file sharing software for the activities
of those who download material without rights holders’ per-
missions, on internet service providers for subscribers’ infring-
ing postings, and on other intermediaries, such as auction
sites.4
Folsom, Toward Non-Neutral Principles of Private Law: Designing Secondary Liabil-
ity Rules for New Technological Uses, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 45, 52 (2009)
(“Secondary liability . . .  might seem chaotic.  Even the choice of words used
to describe the genus, species and strands of the various related doctrines is
not entirely free from doubt.  Sometimes, ‘secondary’ liability refers to the
genus, while ‘vicarious’ and ‘contributory’ refer to two of the species of sec-
ondary liability.  This usage is by no means universal.”).  For example, in the
United States, a fairly established doctrinal structure has been developed by
courts to examine secondary liability in copyright infringement cases, with
relatively clear (if contested) standards for contributory infringement, on
the one hand, and vicarious infringement, on the other.  But even there, it is
unclear whether there is separate secondary liability for “active inducement,”
or whether that concept is simply a variant of the more well-established
forms. See Jay Dratler, Palsgraf, Principles of Tort Law and the Persistent Need for
Common Law Judgment, Perhaps Even on IP Infringement, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP.
J.  (forthcoming 2009) (outlining the elements of contributory and vicarious
infringement).  In trademark law, the doctrines are even less clear, with far
less judicial exploration of the differences between contributory and vicari-
ous infringement. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
853-54 (1982); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc.,
955 F.2d 1143, 1148-52 (7th Cir. 1992).  Thus, in this paper, we have used
the term “secondary liability” as an umbrella term to encompass broadly the
different bases under which an intermediary would be held liable not for
unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s mark, but for use of the mark by a third
party.  We do so fully cognizant of the difficulties of characterization that will
ensue, but that is  a problem intrinsic to this topic that will confront any
proposed solution.
4. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005) (claim against purveyors of peer-to-peer software); Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (claim against manufac-
turers of video-cassette recorders); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1010-1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (claims against distributors of peer-to-
peer software); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469
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These suits raise many of the same problems as appear in
other transnational intellectual property litigation, where the
territoriality principle makes it difficult to localize the entire
dispute in a single jurisdiction and where the resulting
proliferation of potential suits leads to forum shopping, uncer-
tainty over liability, conflicting demands, and overlapping
rights.  However, secondary liability actions also create further
complications in that the policies they implicate extend be-
yond those found in the context of direct infringement.  Thus,
secondary liability more directly involves the trade-off between
“supporting creative pursuits . . . and promoting innovation in
[the] new communication technologies [that make infringe-
ment possible].”5
In principle, secondary liability actions can occur in all
areas of intellectual property.  However, they are most preva-
lent in cases involving digitally transmitted content—which is
to say, trademarks and copyrighted material.6  For purposes of
this paper, we concentrate on trademark cases, such as the liti-
gation involving the responsibility of the online auction house,
eBay, for the sale of counterfeit goods on its website.7  The
problems posed in this area are particularly complex.  Activity
potentially giving rise to secondary liability may interfere with
the signaling function of trademarks.  At the same time, how-
ever, that activity allows sellers to reach larger markets and fa-
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting Tiffany’s attempt to hold auction site liable for
sale of counterfeit items on its website.”); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Hold-
ings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (considering whether defendant
cable company’s digital video recorder system, allowing home recording of
cable broadcasts, infringed plaintiff’s copyrights).  Indeed, some of the big-
gest battles in recent years have revolved around whether particular activity
should be treated under principles of direct or secondary infringement. See,
e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir.
2008) (considering whether copying of copyrighted content was performed
by cable company in ways that gave rise to direct liability); Stacey L. Dogan &
Mark A. Lemley, Trademark and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS.
L. REV. 777 (2004) (liability of search engines for sale of keywords under
trademark law).
5. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 928.
6. This is not to say that similar issues will not arise in the context of
patent law.  Patentees have recently begun to confront issues of digitized
material crossing borders in ways that might adversely affect their rights. See,
e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437 (2007); NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
7. See, e.g., Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
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cilitates legitimate uses of marks by owners of legitimate prod-
ucts.  These cases thus pit the marketing interests of trademark
holders against the development of new mechanisms for trad-
ing in goods.
After offering a stylized fact pattern to illustrate the
problems, we consider the different ways in which courts
might deal with questions arising in cases where secondary lia-
bility claims are asserted.  We suggest that the traditional ap-
proach to choice of law in trademark cases generates unac-
ceptable uncertainties for intermediaries and that a genuine
engagement with conflicts scholarship would help mediate
among the diverse interests and policy concerns.  In the end,
however, we conclude that private international law solutions
may not resolve all the complications of multinational secon-
dary liability cases.  Thus, we are moved to propose, as an alter-
native solution, an autonomous (substantive) principle appli-
cable in these cases. We conclude with some thoughts about
how the different approaches engage with existing models for
the resolution of trans-border intellectual property disputes
and with the international intellectual property regime more
generally.
II. TRADITIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPROACHES TO
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
To see the problems with applying traditional solutions,
consider the following problem:
Z-Bay runs a worldwide auction site, which makes
goods available to bidders around the world.  The
site is valuable to buyers and sellers alike.  Buyers can
go to a single site to find goods from diverse geo-
graphically separate marketplaces. Sellers like it be-
cause it aggregates bidders, which likely increases the
prices at which goods are sold.8  A large variety of
products are available on Z-Bay, including original
goods manufactured by or for the sellers; used mer-
chandise, including antiques, jewelry, accessories,
and art; and even counterfeit goods—that is, goods
8. An alternative economic analysis of auction behavior might suggest
that a worldwide market could bring the price closer to marginal cost, de-
pending on whether the global nature of the market increases supply or
demand.
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that simulate the appearance of a trademark holder’s
product which bear a spurious mark that is identical
to the trademark holder’s.9  Sellers create their own
description of the goods on the site.  However, Z-Bay
has an extensive monitoring program aimed at main-
taining trust in its auction sites.  These efforts include
banning of sites that expressly offer counterfeit
(“knock off”) goods and a program called UnReAL,
which allows trademark owners to report to Z-Bay any
listing offering potentially infringing items, so that Z-
Bay can remove items that are not genuine.
For trademark holders, Z-Bay presents at least
two potential problems.  First, the used goods placed
on the market exert a downward pressure on the
price at which new goods can be marketed.  Second,
counterfeit goods can disrupt the trademark holder’s
business and destroy its reputation and goodwill.
These problems ultimately led two trademark holders
to sue Z-Bay for injunctive and monetary relief:
Epiphany sued in Xandia, Z-Bay’s residence;10 LuiV
sued in Patria, where its own headquarters are lo-
cated.  In both cases, the plaintiff claimed that Z-Bay
was contributorily liable for the infringements com-
mitted by those selling goods on its site.
The Patrian court applied Patrian trademark law
on direct and contributory liability and decided the
case in favor of LuiV.  Focusing on standard trade-
mark law values, it held that an injunction was neces-
sary to protect consumers against deception and pro-
ducers against the loss of their investment in good-
will.  Finding that Z-Bay should have done more to
police its marketplace, it enjoined Z-Bay from permit-
ting the sale of counterfeit goods as well as genuine
goods first sold outside of Patria.  The court also re-
9. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 1127 (2009); see also Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 51 n.14, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement] (defining “counterfeit trademark goods”).
10. By residence, we mean to include such concepts as habitual resi-
dence and domicile.
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\42-1\NYI109.txt unknown Seq: 7 17-FEB-10 11:20
2009] SECONDARY LIABILITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES 207
quired Z-Bay to ban used goods when they are adver-
tised without a full disclaimer of connection with
LuiV.  In addition, it awarded damages based on past
sales of these products worldwide.
In contrast, the Xandian court applied Xandian
trademark law on direct and contributory liability
and decided the case in favor of Z-Bay.  Focusing on
issues of technological development and free trade, it
held that an injunction would interfere with the de-
velopment of new business models and would pre-
vent consumers from freely alienating legitimate
goods.  Holding that Z-Bay had done enough to po-
lice its marketplace, the court also denied monetary
relief.11
Each of the decisions on liability involves a plausible inter-
pretation of trademark law, and each court’s approach to juris-
diction and applicable law reflects how courts tend to deal
with transnational intellectual property disputes.  Courts typi-
cally assume jurisdiction over claims asserted under their own
trademark law; they ordinarily will not apply foreign trade-
mark law or adjudicate foreign trademark rights.12  And the
fact that a decision may have some extraterritorial effect has
not traditionally precluded courts from granting relief.13
However, the interaction of these decisions is troubling
from many perspectives.  For Z-Bay, the problem is that it will
be difficult to receive the benefits of its Xandian victory while
complying with the Patrian judgment.  It could segment the
11. This hypothetical is loosely based on LVMH v. eBay, Tribunal de
commerce [T.C.P.] [court of trade] Paris, June 30, 2008, available at http://
web20.nixonpeabody.com/np20/np20wiki/PDF%20Library/Ebay1.pdf (de-
cided in favor of the rights holders) and Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 463
(decided in favor of eBay).  Litigation of the question continues in a number
of countries.  For recent examples, both favoring eBay, see L’Oreal v. eBay,
[2009] EWHC 1094 (Ch.) (May 22, 2009) (U.K.) and L’Oreal v. eBay, Tribu-
nal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Paris, 3e ch., May 14, 2009, RG 07/11365.
12. See Barcelona.com v. Excelentisimo, 330 F.3d 617, 618-19 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that United States courts will not entertain actions to enforce
trademark rights under foreign law); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and
Territory: Detaching Trademark Law From the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885,
904-5 (2004) (outlining approaches of U.S. courts).
13. But see infra note 21 (discussing the exercise of restraint by courts in R
trademark cases).
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market and police each country’s auction site according to
that nation’s law.14  However that would destroy the benefits of
aggregating buyers and sellers, and would restrict the sale of
genuine trademarked goods.  Alternatively, it could preserve
the worldwide auction, but only by adopting the restrictive
business model imposed by the Patrian court, leading to signif-
icant costs.15  Most important, it faces significant uncertainties,
for Epiphany, LuiV, or new trademark holders could sue in yet
another jurisdiction, where the new court might impose even
more burdensome monitoring requirements and award fur-
ther monetary relief.16  All these are also problems for custom-
ers: they could lose the benefits of the consolidated auction
site or be forced to pay the costs of Z-Bay’s enhanced enforce-
ment obligations.
From the perspective of the states involved, the outcome
is not wholly satisfactory either, for each state can undermine
the interests of the other.  If Z-Bay adopts the restrictive model
in order to comply with the Patrian decision, then Patria is
essentially permitted to extrude its policies on a worldwide ba-
sis.  Xandia’s interest in supporting a global marketplace
would be frustrated, as would be its domestic policy of foster-
ing the development of so-called Web 2.0 technologies, which
facilitate not only global marketing, but also such activities as
global communication, collaboration, and social networking.
It would also diminish innovation in related fields, such as de-
14. Many global online commercial actors have adapted their business
models to limit participation in their marketplace by consumers in one
country or another because of, inter alia, different applicable legal norms.
For example, some might refuse to send goods to a particular jurisdiction.
However, compelling this type of behavior effectively requires the adoption
of second-best solutions.
15. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993)
(Souter, J.) (noting that a defendant can comply with two different judg-
ments so long as one does not require action that the other prohibits).
16. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1219
(W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting parallel actions in Europe on counterpart trade-
marks); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir.
1997) (insisting that proceedings in France and the United States implicated
separate copyrights even though both actions involved the same software);
David Becker, Microsoft-Lindows Battle Expands in Europe, CNET NEWS.COM,
Dec. 8, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft-Lindows-battle-expands-in-
Europe/2100-7344_3-5116840.html (Microsoft claiming infringement of
parallel trademarks in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg).
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veloping advertising models and payment schemes.17  Further-
more, even if the law of Patria prevails, the decision may jeop-
ardize Patria’s long-term interests in that the outcome invites
other countries to apply their own laws extraterritorially in
later cases, without regard for Patria.18  Of course, these two
cases may lead Z-Bay to decide to segregate its auction sites.
But in that case, the trading interests of both Xandia and Pa-
tria are damaged because their buyers and sellers lose the ad-
vantages of an abundant and diversified marketplace.
III. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
In large part, all of these problems stem from a commit-
ment to territoriality in the face of global commerce.  The re-
luctance to adjudicate foreign trademark disputes means that
parties are compelled to re-litigate national claims in a num-
ber of fora.  And even if a single court can assume jurisdiction
over a worldwide case, the territorial nature of intellectual
property rights means that such an action would properly in-
volve the assessment of a number of discrete national claims
under numerous (and potentially different) national laws.
A. Proposals by the ALI and CLIP
Both the ALI and CLIP suggest that the solution to the
territoriality problem is to make it easier to bring actions
against direct infringers.  First, they provide a greater opportu-
nity for consolidation than presently exists.  Under these pro-
posals, it is likely that a trademark holder could bring all of its
worldwide claims against a seller (or in some instances, sellers)
in a single court.19  Second, both projects would, in excep-
17. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Secondary Liability and the Fragmentation of Digital
Copyright Law, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 105 (2009), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345355.
18. As William Baxter explained, American states do not necessarily have
an interest in the application of their own laws in all possible situations. See
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1963).
19. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, §§ 212, 221-223. Under the ALI Prin- R
ciples, the location of the suit would, of course, be governed by the personal
jurisdiction provisions. See, e.g., id. §§ 201 (residence), 204 (infringement
actions), 206 (multiple defendants).  More speculatively, depending upon
the relationship (if any) between the claims of the respective mark owners,
the ALI Project might also permit Z-Bay to litigate the entirety of both dis-
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tional cases of ubiquitous infringement, permit courts to dero-
gate from the territorial approach and simplify the case by ap-
plying a single law to the entire dispute.  For example, § 321 of
the ALI Principles provides that:
When the alleged infringing activity is ubiquitous and
the laws of multiple States are pleaded, the court may
choose to apply to the issues of existence, validity, du-
ration, attributes, and infringement of intellectual
property rights and remedies for their infringement,
the law or laws of the State or States with close con-
nections to the dispute.20
These changes significantly improve the options for trade-
mark owners.  For example, under traditional trademark prin-
ciples, if LuiV were to bring an action for direct infringement
against the seller (or sellers) of counterfeit goods, it would be
required to initiate a separate action in each country where an
infringement occurred, alleging a violation of separate na-
tional trademark laws.  In each court, LuiV would have to prove
its ownership of a trademark and infringing acts by the seller.
On both issues, courts typically apply their own domestic law,
requiring LuiV to prove ownership of rights under the lex fori
and (in many cases) local use of the LuiV mark by the seller in
ways likely to cause confusion.  However, despite early judicial
suggestions, use online does not constitute use everywhere.21
putes together in Xandia or Patria, and thus receive a single judgment bind-
ing upon both trademark holders.  But this extended form of consolidation,
involving numerous disparate parties, was not at the core of the consolida-
tion provisions in the ALI Principles and the diversity of parties might make
the argument for consolidation harder to sustain, especially in countries
where the notion of broad multiparty, multistate litigation is less common.
For the analogous provisions of the CLIP Principles, see CLIP, supra note 2, R
arts. 2:102 (general jurisdiction); 2:202 (special jurisdiction on infringe-
ment); 2:203 (extent of jurisdiction); 2:205 (multiple defendants).
20. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 321(1).  Article 3:603(1) of the
CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, similarly provides that:
In disputes concerned with infringement carried out through ubiq-
uitous media such as the Internet, the court may apply the law or
the laws of the State or the States having the closest connection
with the infringement, if the infringement arguably takes place in
every State in which the signals can be received.
21. Although the question of where a seller “used” a mark when acting
online initially presented difficulties for many national courts—for example,
regarding whether the seller “uses” the mark only where it uploads the ad-
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Each national court would be able to grant an injunction and
award damages only in respect of the national claim before it
based on the use in that country.
In contrast, the ALI and CLIP projects would allow LuiV
to save litigation costs by consolidating all of its separate na-
tional claims against direct infringers in a single action.  Some
hope (and others might fear) that the adjudication by a single
court of similar claims under multiple national laws might ex-
ert a de facto centripetal force on applicable law and that a
court hearing such a case would apply one law (normally its
own) to the entire dispute.22  However, instead of relying on
subconscious judicial assimilation, both the ALI Principles and
the CLIP Project take a proactive role.  Because the case in-
volves ubiquitous infringement, they would permit LuiV to
simplify the case and apply a single law to the worldwide dis-
pute.23
vertisement, or where the advertisement could be viewed—a growing con-
sensus suggests that the question of where use occurs must be answered with
an eye to where commercial effects are felt.  That is the solution adopted by
the WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection
of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on the Internet.
Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks,
and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet, Assembly of
the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and General As-
sembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Doc. 845(E),
art. 2, Sept. 24-Oct. 3, 2001, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pdf/pub845.pdf [hereinafter Joint
Recommendation on Internet Use]. See also infra text accompanying notes
60-61. R
22. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Remarks, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 885, 894
(2005) (noting the potential temptation on the part of trial judges to apply a
single law to efficiently decide multiple similar claims); Graeme W. Austin,
Intellectual Property Politics and the Private International Law of Copyright Owner-
ship, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 899 (2005) (discussing relationship between con-
solidated jurisdiction and principle of territoriality).  Indeed, that is essen-
tially what happened in the Xandia/Patria hypothetical.  And the French
court in one of the decisions that inspired the hypothetical likewise was in-
sensitive to the possibility of divergent laws governing foreign conduct. See
LVMH v. eBay, Tribunal de commerce [T.C.P.] [court of trade] Paris, June
30, 2008, available at http://web20.nixonpeabody.com/np20/np20wiki/
PDF%20Library/Ebay1.pdf.
23. The relevant provision of the CLIP Principles is not as conducive to
application in trademark cases because it is limited to situations where “the
infringement arguably takes place in every State in which the signals can be
received.”  CLIP art. 3:603.  However, it would likely apply in cases of well
known marks, where rights are essentially ubiquitous.
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This approach recognizes that, despite historical commit-
ments to territoriality, the application of numerous national
laws to conduct that bears no overriding connection to a single
state is not only inefficient but arguably also relatively weak in
prescriptive legitimacy.24  To identify the single applicable law,
it is necessary to consider multiple connecting factors.  Section
321 of the ALI Principles suggests that, in determining the ap-
plicable law(s) in cases of ubiquitous infringement, courts
should look at:
(a) where the parties reside;
(b) where the parties’ relationship, if any, is cen-
tered;
(c) the extent of the activities and the investment of
the parties; and
(d) the principal markets toward which the parties
directed their activities.25
In an action against a single seller, it may appear that
these factors point equally strongly to the residence of the
seller and of the trademark holder.  However, this is not the
case.  On Z-Bay, the seller is directing its activity to the entire
world and the buyers are not likely to know where the seller
resides.  Accordingly, the strongest connections are with Pa-
tria, the residence of LuiV, the trademark holder.26  The con-
24. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000) (supporting the
development of potentially different substantive law norms in truly interna-
tional cases).
25. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 321(1); see also CLIP art. 3:603
(2)(a)–(d) (listing the relevant factors as: (a) the infringer’s habitual resi-
dence; (b) the infringer’s principal place of business; (c) the place where
substantial activities in furthering the infringement in its entirety have been
carried out; (d) the place where the harm caused by the infringement is
substantial in relation to the infringement in its entirety).
26. The CLIP Principles may lean more strongly than the ALI Principles
towards applying the law of the place where the alleged infringer is located,
arguably casting some doubt on the invariable application of the law of Pa-
tria.  But even under the CLIP Principles, Patria remains the most likely ap-
plicable law.  Moreover, the applicable law may, to some extent, be shaped
by the architecture of the cause of action. See Richard Garnett & Megan
Richardson, Libel Tourism or Just Redress?  Reconciling the (English) Right to Repu-
tation with the (American) Right to Free Speech in Cross-Border Libel Cases, 5 J. PRIV.
INT’L LAW (2009) (forthcoming) (discussing Gutnick), which is largely within
the control of the plaintiff trademark owner.  Thus, a trademark owner seek-
ing to diminish the claims of the law of the place of a single seller might (in
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clusion in favor of Patria is even more obvious in actions
against multiple sellers, who potentially reside all over the
world.
However, even under these innovative approaches, there
are problems.  Both the ALI Principles and the CLIP Princi-
ples contain safety features designed to reflect the continued
territorial nature of intellectual property laws.  For example,
the ALI would permit the court to apply the laws of more than
one country, if those laws have sufficient connection with the
dispute.  In that case, the court would apply each of the laws
chosen to the relevant part of the case.27  In addition, the ALI
regime would allow the parties to carve out specific jurisdic-
tions and demonstrate that the law of that particular state dif-
fers from the law chosen.  In such cases, relief would be fash-
ioned to deal, for example, with states where the trademark is
not recognized or which have very different rules on exhaus-
tion.28  These provisions improve the accuracy of the outcome
and give greater deference to the interests of states other than
the one with the closest connection to the case.  But they do
make adjudicating the case more complicated and interfere
with the possibility of arriving at a global solution.
An even more significant problem is that—especially
given the complexities involved in suing direct infringers—
trademark holders may find the simplifications provided by
these projects insufficient.  Accordingly, they are still likely to
prefer the efficiencies of suing a single defendant—namely, Z-
Bay—under a theory of secondary liability.29  If LuiV were to
addition to emphasizing the ubiquity of the buyers) try to consolidate sellers
in other jurisdictions.
27. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 321(1).
28. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 321(2); cf. Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Chuckleberry Corp., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (injunction in
the United States did not bar defendant publisher from maintaining its In-
ternet site in other countries where plaintiff did not possess trademark
rights, but could be invoked to limit access of Americans to web site hosted
in Italy).  CLIP also permits the parties to prove that particular state laws
differ from the one chosen by the court. See CLIP, supra note 2, art.
3:603(3).
29. For example, in the U.S. case on which our hypothetical is loosely
based, Tiffany reported to eBay 284,149 separate listings which it claimed
included infringing items. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d
463, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  While it is not clear how many sellers this in-
volved, it suggests that the numbers are high.
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sue Z-Bay for conduct that enabled infringement occurring in
a multitude of countries, the case would once again be consoli-
dated (for jurisdictional reasons, this time, most likely in
Xandia).  However, regardless of where the dispute was consol-
idated, the prevailing assumption of intellectual property
scholars has been that the law governing the claim of contribu-
tory infringement should follow that applicable to the alleged
acts of direct infringement.30  Neither the ALI Principles nor
the CLIP project challenges this assumption.  Under this ap-
proach, then, the claim would again be regarded as relating to
ubiquitous infringement, leading the court to apply § 321.
Since contributory infringement depends on the law applica-
ble to direct infringement, the Xandian court would apply Pat-
rian law, for the reasons set out above.  Indeed, it is even
clearer here that the law of Patria will apply because now both
sellers and buyers are located in many different countries, di-
luting the significance of the law of any single seller’s resi-
dence.31
Fusing the law applicable to direct and secondary liability
is problematic for a number of reasons.  Viewed through the
lens of contacts between the plaintiff and the direct infringer,
30. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 301 cmt. h (“In some States, facili-
tation (or ‘authorization’) of infringement may itself be an infringing act . . .
[i]n such cases, the law that governs the determination of primary infringe-
ment applies.”); cf. Folsom, supra note 3 (exploring the nexus between a R
primary question of direct liability and a secondary question of whether a
third party should be held responsible for the acts of the direct infringer);
Graeme W. Austin, Importing Kazaa–Exporting Grokster, 22 SANTA CLARA COM-
PUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 577, 596 (2006) (discussing root copy theory and
suggesting that “[t]hough the lines between various forms of domestic in-
fringement may be blurry . . . geopolitical lines are not: the territoriality
principle should preclude application of U.S. liability theories where the pri-
mary acts of infringement occur abroad.”).
31. Z-Bay might in theory avoid the broadest application of Patrian law
by availing itself of the safeguards provided by the ALI and CLIP principles.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (discussing safeguards).  Thus, it R
could argue that while its conduct is considered to be contributory infringe-
ment under Patrian law, Xandian law imposes less demanding standards in
that respect, thereby forcing the court to take Xandian law into account in
fashioning the remedy.  However, such a carve-out will hardly lead to mean-
ingful results for Z-Bay, because, in practice, it will mean that Z-Bay must
limit its auction site to Xandia (or any other country or countries where it
can be proven that the legal situation corresponds to that in Xandia),
thereby disrupting its specific business model.
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the conflicts analysis may be incomplete.32  For direct infringe-
ment, the parties’ interests will ordinarily serve as proxies for
state interests.  For example, the interest of the trademark
holder will capture the state’s interest in encouraging invest-
ment in goodwill.  However the additional state interests impli-
cated more directly by contributory (or any other form of sec-
ondary) infringement may not be fully captured by looking
simply at the parties involved in the direct infringement.  For
instance, an interest in regulating emerging technologies is, in
reality, an interest in fostering the entry of new market players,
who will often be competitors to the parties before the court.
Taking these other interests into account favors the applica-
tion of Xandian law to the case against Z-Bay.
To be sure, one solution to an incomplete list of connect-
ing factors would be to supplement § 321.  For example, the
list of connecting factors could be expanded to include the
interests of the states where the relevant technology was being
developed or where the intermediary was based.  However, ad-
ding new connecting factors to accommodate additional con-
cerns relevant to secondary liability might have the effect of
diluting factors that should have more determinative weight in
the context of direct infringement.
To put this another way, the strategy of enlarging the list
of connecting factors to accommodate the possibility of secon-
dary infringement claims merely highlights the basic problem
in the approach taken by both projects: because the projects
conceptualize secondary liability as derivative of primary liabil-
32. Moreover, the claim against the direct infringer might be character-
ized as ubiquitous less easily than might the contributory claims against Z-
Bay.  Likewise, depending on the standard for contributory infringement (in
particular, whether a court would look at whether the defendant’s service
facilitated infringement only in the case of the trademark before it, or more
systemically with respect to trademarked products more generally), choosing
a single law applicable to the entire dispute might be difficult.  Even if a
single law is identified, a party unhappy with the law chosen might seek ref-
uge within Section 321(2), which provides that “notwithstanding the State or
States designated pursuant to subsection (1), a party may prove that, with
respect to particular States covered by the action, the solution provided by
any of those States’ laws differs from that obtained under the law(s) chosen
to apply to the case as a whole.  The court shall take into account such differ-
ences in determining the scope of liability and remedies.” ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 1, § 321(2). R
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\42-1\NYI109.txt unknown Seq: 16 17-FEB-10 11:20
216 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 42:201
ity (“facilitating infringement”33), they make the law on one
issue inappropriately hostage to the law on the other.  This
intellectual-property-centric view (arguably grounded in legiti-
mate intellectual property policies) fails to consider non-tradi-
tional intellectual property interests or whether, as in other
tort contexts, the two types of liability might be determined
under different laws.34
B. An Autonomous Tort Approach: Determining Law
Applicable to Secondary Liability
1. Grounds For and Operation of a Tort-Based Conflicts Rule
A simpler—albeit more radical—solution to the problems
raised by the hypothetical Z-Bay case would be to recognize
that contributory infringement actions are, at bottom, torts
and treat them autonomously, rather than as supplementary
forms of intellectual property infringement actions.  Like the
result under the ubiquitous infringement provisions of the
ALI and CLIP projects, a single law will apply to the claim
against Z-Bay.  However, as the choice of law applicable will
not automatically follow the law applicable to direct infringe-
ment, courts could embark on a more nuanced analysis.  The
choice would properly reflect all of the policy concerns at play
in contributory infringement cases.  For example, the court
would now include in the analysis the interest in facilitating
worldwide sales, developing new business models, and encour-
aging technological innovation.
33. Id. § 301 cmt. h.
34. The Second Restatement provides that “The local law of the state
which has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
with respect to the issue of vicarious liability should be applied in determining
whether one person is liable for the tort of another person.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 174 cmt. a (1971) (emphasis added).  It
recognizes that “vicarious liability may . . . be imposed by application of the
local law of some state other than that of conduct and injury.” Id. § 174 cmt.
c.  Moreover, courts have recognized that secondary liability might implicate
different state interests than a claim of primary liability. See, e.g., Tkaczevski
v. Rider Truck Rental, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); cf. Cates
v. Creamer, 431 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2005) (reversing trial court’s choice
of law analysis because it applied the most significant relationship test by
focusing on the place of conduct and injury factors generally relevant to tort
cases rather than factors relevant to the issue of vicarious liability).
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This approach conceptualizes contributory infringement
claim as a tort that serves different social purposes from the
tort actions that underlie direct infringement liability.35  In
fact, this approach is consistent with the way the laws of secon-
dary infringement appear to be developing.  For example, the
justification for secondary copyright infringement is arguably
different from the rationale for direct infringement.36  The
copyright statute—unlike the patent statute—makes no sepa-
rate, express provision for secondary liability.  However, in
Grokster, the U.S. Supreme Court partially grounded the devel-
opment of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement
in common law principles that extend the scope of potential
liability to persons not engaged in acts of primary infringe-
ment.37  And the policy reasons for sustaining—or resisting—
such expansions go beyond the considerations typically at play
in determining primary infringement.38  Similarly, the Austra-
lian courts view “authorization” as a discrete cause of action (a
35. In addition, stated in the language of contemporary conflicts analysis,
secondary liability rules might be characterized as loss-allocating as opposed
to conduct-regulating. See Tkaczevski, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 173.  Questions of
direct infringement centrally involve the interests of the state where conduct
occurs. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Courier, 153 F.3d 82
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that issues involving alleged infringement of copy-
rights in works created by Russian nationals and first published in Russia
would be governed by U.S. law where the location of alleged infringement
was the United States); cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d
633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956) (noting that “the wrong takes place where the pass-
ing off occurs, i.e., where the deceived customer buys the defendant’s prod-
uct in the belief that he is buying the plaintiff’s”).  Loss-allocating rules do
not as directly implicate the place of conduct. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts, 480
N.E.2d 679, 685 (N.Y. 1985).
36. See Lipton, supra note 17, at 14; see also Mark Bartholomew, Copyright, R
Trademark and Secondary Liability After Grokster, COLUM. J. L. & ARTS. (forth-
coming 2009) (Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2009-
06 at 20-21, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329058); Folsom, supra
note 3, at 54, 59-60. R
37. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-35 (2005)
(“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is
such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based
liability derived from the common law.”).
38. See id. at 929-30 (noting concerns at play where plaintiff seeks to re-
strain the distribution of technology); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (discussing policy issues raised by efforts to enjoin
sales of VCRs).
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view also held by some courts in the United States).39  While
these courts have made the substantive move to consider sec-
ondary liability as a separate tort, they have not explicitly ad-
dressed the choice of law question.40
Under what we are calling “the autonomous tort ap-
proach,” LuiV could sue Z-Bay under a single law that is more
appropriately attuned to the concerns at play in determining
liability for contributory infringement.  In a jurisdiction that
employed interest analysis, the relevant factors might simply
mirror those enumerated in § 321.  However, the party rele-
vant to the analysis would be Z-Bay and the trademark holders,
rather than the direct infringers.  It would also be possible to
refine the analysis further.  Thus, the factors could be ex-
panded so that courts choosing the law applicable to secon-
dary liability would consider:
(a) where the parties reside;
(b) where the parties’ relationship, if any, is cen-
tered;
(c) the extent of the activities and the investment of
the parties;
39. See, e.g., Moorhouse v. Univ. of New South Wales (1976) 133 C.L.R. 1
(claiming copyright infringement based on authorizing the reproduction of
part of a book); Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Hold-
ings Ltd. (2005) F.C.A. 1242 (Austl.) (creating separate causes of action); see
also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 301, Reporters’ Note 6.  In the United R
Kingdom, causes of action for authorizing copyright infringement are set
out in different statutory provisions. See Copyright, Designs & Patents Act,
1988, c. 48, §§ 16(1)–(2).  In the United States, the majority approach re-
jects an autonomous cause of action for authorization of infringing acts. See
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comms. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc).  But this approach is not without critics. See Curb v. MCA,
898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
40. A recent decision by Stockholm Tingsrätt [TR] [Stockholm District
Court] 2009-04-17 ref B 13301-06 (Swed.) adopts a similarly unengaged ap-
proach to copyright infringement, albeit with some recognition of cross-bor-
der implications.  The case primarily involved the criminal liability of per-
sons hosting a large bit-torrent tracker. Id. at 16.  However, the judgment
also addressed civil liability of the defendants because a number of rights
holders—partly based in Scandinavia, partly in the United States—had
claimed and obtained substantial damages. Id. at 15-16.  The court applied
Swedish law (without discussing the issue of applicable law), id. at 46, but
deducted a certain percentage of the damages claimed to have been caused
by illegal downloading, because, as the decision put it, those acts “also oc-
curred outside of Sweden.” Id. at 70-71.
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(d) the principal markets toward which the parties
directed their activities;
(e) the place of any alleged direct infringement;
(f) the nature of the primary activity alleged to be
infringing; and
(f) the place or places where the technological inno-
vations at issue were created.41
In countries adhering to the lex loci delicti rule to deter-
mine the law applicable to tort actions, identifying the locus of
the separate tort of contributory infringement would likely
lead to the same result as under interest analysis informed by
an expanded list of connecting factors.42
There are several other ramifications of adopting an au-
tonomous tort approach to secondary liability.  First, this ap-
proach truly conceives of the problem as global and provides a
global solution determined by a single law.  There is no need
to resort to the complications of determining whether in-
fringement is ubiquitous, whether—despite ubiquity—more
than one law applies, or whether there is a need to carve out
specific jurisdictions from the scope of relief.  Second, separat-
ing the causes of action for analytical purposes makes clear
that rights holders can pursue a secondary infringement claim
without necessarily bringing the suit in a jurisdiction where di-
rect infringers can be joined.43  Third, intermediaries will find
their conduct judged by a law that is likely open to their con-
cerns about technological development and new business
models.  Fourth, while Z-Bay might be vulnerable to multiple
41. These factors in ALI Section 321 are similar to those enumerated in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971), which is
the general rule for determining applicable law in tort actions. See id. at
§ 145(2) (listing “the place where the injury occurred, the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred, the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered” as “contacts
to be taken into account” in determining “the law applicable to an issue”
under Section 145).  These factors are a modified version of that list.
42. Commission Regulation 864/2007 art. 4, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 41, 44
(EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_
199/l_19920070731en00400049.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 422 n.2 (where the plaintiff thought it nec-
essary to join a direct infringer).  Since issues of personal jurisdiction over
direct infringers can complicate the case, this can be an important advan-
tage for rights holders.
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lawsuits and no new trademark holder would be estopped
from re-litigating the issues, its vulnerability to further suits is
likely reduced for reasons of comity or stare decisis.  At the
very least, the same trademark holder could not bring serial
actions against Z-Bay in a number of different countries, hop-
ing to find a hospitable forum.44  Fifth, because the liability of
intermediaries will likely be more limited, trademark holders
now have more reason to pursue their own actions against di-
rect infringers.  In these actions, they are likely to be litigating
under a set of rules more favorable to their interests and to
trademark values generally.45  Thus, in these direct infringe-
ment suits trademark values will be of paramount considera-
tion not only in determining the applicable law, but also in
deciding the case.
To put this another way, one problem with the result if
the Patrian court simply viewed the question of secondary lia-
bility through the lens of the actions for direct infringement is
that it could easily ignore the benefit of a viable secondary
market in trademarked goods.  When the case is broken into
two parts, this does not happen.  Where the focus is on the
intermediary, all of the activity on the website tends to be con-
sidered as a whole.  At the same time, however, genuine trade-
mark interests are not ignored.  Indeed, they are more care-
fully considered: in the action against direct infringers, the
court can engage in a more fine-grained analysis and distin-
guish between counterfeiters and legitimate resellers.46  The
end result is that the market for the sale of used goods is less
likely to be suppressed.
Notwithstanding these systemic effects, courts (and some
intellectual property scholars) have insisted that a finding of
direct infringement is a necessary predicate to making out a
case for secondary liability.  Some of these concerns seem for-
malistic, insisting that logic dictates a particular order for try-
44. See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1221
(W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting that Microsoft had pursued litigation in seven
states).
45. The tort move might also change the jurisdictional analysis because
the contracts relevant for determining specific jurisdiction may now be dif-
ferent.
46. Courts could further distinguish among counterfeits, grey goods, and
goods in respect of which the trademark holder’s rights have been ex-
hausted.
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ing and deciding a case.47  But experience suggests that these
arguments do implicate real policy concerns.  For example, us-
ing equitable trust doctrines, the U.S. courts have used the ex-
istence of a “root copy” or “predicate act” in the United States
to assume prescriptive authority over allegedly infringing activ-
ity abroad that flows from the U.S. conduct.48  Courts applying
this theory have not typically begun their analysis by asking for
proof that the acts abroad were infringing under the foreign
law in question.49  Likewise, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act prohibits the sale of circumvention tools regardless of
whether they are being used to enable specific acts of copy-
right infringement.50  Because the root copy cases have thus
resulted in copyright holders securing damages for acts abroad
47. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088
(9th Cir. 1994); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc.,
866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
48. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987,
991-92 (9th Cir. 1998) (unauthorized transmission and copy of work made
in the United States and then further transmitted to Europe and Africa),
later proceedings, L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 340 F.3d 926,
931-32 (9th Cir. 2003); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67,
72-73 (2d Cir. 1988) (unauthorized copy of plaintiff’s poster made in the
United States and then further copied and distributed in Israel); Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939) (awarding
plaintiff profits from both U.S. and Canadian exhibition of infringing mo-
tion picture where a copy of the motion picture had been made in the
United States and then shipped to Canada for exhibition), aff’d, 309 U.S.
390 (1940).
49. See, e.g, Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 52. But cf. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v.
Hastings, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981) (declining to enjoin foreign exhibition
absent proof that foreign copyright laws were infringed).
50. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d
Cir. 2001).  More recently, courts have deployed a number of interpretations
of the statute to defeat efforts to use the DMCA to repress competition in
the market for uncopyrightable products and services, and thus have insisted
(at a general level) on some nexus between the rights protected by copyright
law and the technological protection measures that are alleged to have been
unlawfully circumvented. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192-93 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545 (6th Cir. 2004); Storage
Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2008) (prohibiting the
manufacture of technology “primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title.”). See generally Jerome H. Reichman,
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown
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not proved to be infringing, they extrude U.S. national copy-
right law to the global market.51  The DMCA similarly tends to
expand the scope of rights holders’ control over possibly non-
infringing uses.52
However, as noted at the outset, secondary liability for in-
tellectual property infringement is, in many ways, more than
just another means to ensure efficient enforcement of rights.
Rather, the regulation of the behavior of intermediaries can
conceivably be regarded as a new objective of intellectual
property law, raising autonomous concerns.  Certainly, the
possibility of acts of infringement that span national borders
has intensified.  And some legal regimes have created supple-
mentary statutory causes of action to prevent national borders
from becoming a tool for undermining intellectual property
rights.53
The autonomous tort approach to conflicts is also analyti-
cally quite different from the theory underlying root copy lia-
bility.  The real complaint about the root copy cases is that
they fail to take into account the potentially different interests
of the states where the primary activities occurred.  For exam-
ple, courts in these cases rarely consider whether the subse-
quent distributions are infringing under the laws of the coun-
tries of distribution.54  An autonomous conflicts rule is less
Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007).
51. See Graeme W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copy-
right Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 OR. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (2001) (critiquing
root copy theory).
52. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why
the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
519, 519 (1999) (criticizing expansive implementation of the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty in the DMCA).
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), (g) (2003); 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (2008); see also
Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in
the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 701,
706-07 (2004) (discussing provisions of the Patent Act extending extra-terri-
torially).
54. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Law of In-
tellectual Property: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711
(2009); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of Canada in Sup-
port of the Request for Rehearing En Banc Made in the Combined Petition
by Research in Motion, Ltd. for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc,
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (2005) (No. 03-1615),
2005 WL 154290; supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing root copy R
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problematic because it can include the interests of these states
as one of the connecting factors.55
2. Remaining Problems With an Autonomous Tort Approach
Admittedly, this approach does not solve all of the
problems at play in the Z-Bay case.  Even if it allows courts to
choose a conflicts rule that will lead to the application of a
single law applicable to the contributory infringement analy-
sis,56 Z-Bay’s interests are not fully protected.  Because the
core problem for Z-Bay is its inability to efficiently monitor
those who are using its website, it remains vulnerable to suits
by many other trademark holders, none of whom are bound
by the original judgment.  Although the adoption of a uniform
conflicts rule would theoretically lead to the same result in
each case, Z-Bay will face some continuing uncertainty due to
the malleability of the conflicts analysis.  There are two proce-
dural ways to resolve this problem.  One is to provide that suits
may not be brought in states other than the one that resolved
the initial dispute.  (In the Z-Bay case, that would likely be Z-
Bay’s country of domicile.)  The other approach is to allow Z-
Bay to aggregate actions against all potential plaintiffs for dec-
larations of non-liability.
The first solution is feasible only if there is general agree-
ment on a personal jurisdiction rule that restricts the defen-
dant’s amenability to suit.  It is unlikely that most countries
would renounce the use of domestic courts to protect their
theory); Graeme W. Austin, The Infringement of Foreign Intellectual Property
Rights, 113 LAW Q. REV. 321 (1997) (analyzing the basis for jurisdictional
prohibition of actionability of claim of infringement of foreign intellectual
property rights).
55. Moreover, because this approach involves the articulation of a choice
of law rule, the lex causae might still insist on there having to be a showing of
direct infringement.  Indeed, under any conceivable rule regarding secon-
dary liability, it is unlikely that the standard for secondary infringement
could be satisfied without some primary infringement having occurred.  The
more pertinent question is whether there are sufficiently substantial non-
infringing uses being facilitated by the intermediary that we should ignore
the primary infringements that are also facilitated.
56. This approach leads to the adoption of a single law using traditional
conflicts principles, such as lex loci delicti and interest analysis, without ex-
plicit reliance upon the relatively untested notion of ubiquitous infringe-
ment.  Thus, it also demonstrates that the ubiquitous infringement ap-
proach may not be as radical as some believe.
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citizens from local claims.  The second solution is equally un-
realistic.  As with the first solution, it would require some
trademark holders to submit to a jurisdiction with which they
have little relationship (after all, the trademark holders did
not put their own goods up for auction on Z-Bay, and thus
they do not have contacts with its residence).  Additionally,
such a procedure is essentially an action against a class of de-
fendants.  U.S. law contemplates defendant class actions.57
However, they are rarely utilized and it is highly doubtful that
such a procedure would ever be recognized or adopted inter-
nationally.
C. A Substantive Approach to Secondary Liability
A strength of the autonomous tort approach is that, as a
conflicts rule, it gives broad scope to national interests.  A
weakness, however, is that this gives countries latitude to im-
pose their parochial interests above those of the interests of an
international marketplace.  Some countries (Patria) may over-
value trademark holders’ interests and sacrifice international
interests in developing new technologies that integrate world
commerce.  Others may be so supportive of intermediaries’
business interests that they offer insufficient protection to
trademark rights.58  A uniform substantive approach to secon-
dary liability might therefore be preferable.
It is not unknown in intellectual property to adopt sub-
stantive international norms in order to avoid fragmentation
through the application of private international law.  In some
cases, these international instruments limit national prescrip-
tive authority by articulating a substantive rule that displaces
any inconsistent national provision.  For example, the EC Sat-
ellite and Cable Directive defines the act of communication to
the public as occurring only in the country in which material is
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (permitting a class to “sue or be sued”).
58. The TRIPs Agreement by its terms leaves open the question of WTO
members’ obligations to protect against contributory infringement.  The en-
forcement chapter of the Agreement requires members to ensure that “en-
forcement procedures as specified [in the Agreement] are available under
their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of
intellectual property rights . . . including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringe-
ments.”  TRIPs Agreement, art. 41(1).  But it does not dictate that such mea-
sures include actions for secondary infringement.
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uploaded for transmission to the public.  The Directive thus
avoids the consequences of overlapping power in every coun-
try in the footprint of the transmitter.59
Soft law can also act in this manner, promulgating a norm
that becomes the governing substantive international standard
without formally overriding national legislative prerogatives.
For example, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in
Signs on the Internet suggests limiting prescriptive authority
to the states in which the use of a trademark on the Internet
has a “commercial effect.”60  In addition, the Recommenda-
tion protects online actors from overbroad remedial obliga-
tions by cautioning national courts not to enjoin behavior on a
worldwide basis unless it is proportionate to the harm commit-
ted.61
Furthermore, soft law approaches have been adopted to
facilitate effective worldwide enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights when particular conduct is seen as clearly violative
of the international trademark norms.  For example, the Uni-
form Dispute Resolution Policy of the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN’s UDRP) sets out a
series of factors for determining when a party has engaged in
59. See Council Directive 93/83 of 27 September 1993 on the Coordina-
tion of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright
Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission art. 1(2)(b),
1993 O.J. (L 248) 15.  In some respects, the rule in the Cable and Satellite
Directive can be conceptualized as a harmonized choice of law rule, dictat-
ing in which state the transborder act will be deemed to occur.
60. Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of
Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet, art. 2,
WIPO Doc. 845(E) (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Joint Recommendation on In-
ternet Use] (adopted by Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of
Industrial Property and General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property
Organization), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_
iplaw/doc/pub845.doc.  The Recommendation defines commercial effect in
art. 3.  In a similar vein, the CLIP draft principles state that an infringement
shall only be found where the defendant has substantially acted in further-
ance of the infringement or where the infringement has substantial effect.
See CLIP, supra note 2, art. 3:602 (“De Minimis Rule”).
61. See Joint Recommendation on Internet Use, supra note 60, at art. 15
(urging states to avoid remedies that would prohibit all use on the internet);
see also id., Explanatory Note (discussing remedies).
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cybersquatting.62  The soft law character of the UDRP and its
choice of law provision both emphasize the continued impor-
tance of national adjudication and national law.63  However, in
effect, the UDRP has served as the de facto substantive rule
governing cybersquatting disputes in many countries.64  In
part, this is because WIPO’s members agreed that a certain
subset of uses of marks clearly violate the international norm
against unfair competition found in article 10bis of the Paris
Convention.65  As a result, there is now a subset of clearly in-
fringing behavior that is effectively governed by an interna-
tional norm.  In contrast, online disputes between competing
legitimate national trademark owners have remained a matter
of national law.66
These principles—proportionality, and targeting behavior
widely agreed to violate international norms—form the frame-
work for a potential substantive rule on secondary liability.  All
member states of the World Trade Organization have agreed
62. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy  ¶ 4(b) (Oct.
24, 1999) [hereinafter UDRP], available at http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/
udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. .
63. See Laurence Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National
Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 141, 253-74 (2001); Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dis-
pute Resolution Policy, Rule 15(a) (Oct. 24, 1999), available at http://www.
icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (authorizing panels to decide
cases using “any rules and principles of law that [they] deem applicable”);
UDRP, supra note 62, at ¶ 4(k).
64. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Electronic Commerce Work Programme: Submission from Australia, IP/C/W/233, ¶
44 (Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/IP/C/W233.doc (suggesting that the UDRP has “arguably become a de
facto international standard” for the resolution of cybersquatting disputes).
65. Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, ¶ 173-74 (Apr.
30, 1999) (noting that WIPO’s proposed definition of abusive registration
“draws on solid foundations in international and national law and in case
law,” and citing in particular unfair competition provisions of the Paris Con-
vention).
66. See Department of Commerce, Management of Internet Names and
Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,747 (June 10, 1998) (noting scope of pro-
posals); WIPO, Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process ¶ 135(i)
(Apr. 30, 1999) (discussing scope of proposed UDRP). See also Jacqueline D.
Lipton, A Winning Solution for YouTube and Utube, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 509,
509-13 (2008) (discussing the scope of different protections against unau-
thorized use of domain names consisting of trademarks).
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to prohibit the sale of counterfeit products.67  In contrast, the
conditions under which trademark rights are exhausted by the
sale of a legitimate trademarked item vary from one country to
another.  For example, some countries follow a regime of na-
tional or regional exhaustion; other countries adhere to a the-
ory of international exhaustion.  The TRIPS Agreement, the
highest statement of international intellectual property norms,
expressly refused to take a position on this point.68  Countries
are thus free to follow either approach.  Moreover, countries
nominally adopting the same approach to the geographic
scope of exhaustion can take a different approach to the resale
of goods that have been altered in some way or that are
presented to the public in a form that suggests endorsement
or association with the trademark owner.69
Following the approach of targeting behavior widely re-
garded as actionable at the international level, while leaving
more contested questions to national law, suggests that an in-
ternational rule for intermediaries’ liability might hold that:
An intermediary is liable for secondary infringement
if and only if it:
(a) actively induced acts of counterfeiting; or
(b) knew or had reason to know of specific acts
of counterfeiting and failed to expeditiously re-
move offending material;70 or
(c) fails to respond to a court order to remove
specific material from its site.71
67. See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 51 & 61 (provisions dealing with the
suspension of release of counterfeit products by customs officials and crimi-
nal sanctions against counterfeiters).
68. Id. art. 6.
69. See, e.g., Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distribution, LLC,
562 F.3d 1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing what counts as a “material”
difference in resold goods); Case C-348/04, Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Sw-
ingward Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. I-3391, ¶ 3 (discussing conditions under which re-
packaging parallel imports can cause damage to the reputation of the trade-
mark holder and thus give rise to liability notwithstanding free movement of
goods).
70. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 939 (2005) (discussing knowledge necessary to establish secondary in-
fringement); Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 470 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (declining to impose liability where defendant took “appropriate
steps” to prevent its product from being used for infringing activity).
71. A similar rule could be applied to piracy in the copyright context.
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This rule would offer trademark holders an efficient en-
forcement mechanism against counterfeiting not currently
guaranteed by international law.  They can sue Z-Bay in cases
where it is actively inducing counterfeit sales (subsection (a)).
They can also provide Z-Bay with notice of counterfeiting and
force Z-Bay to remove counterfeit goods.  If new technically
and commercially feasible monitoring technologies are devel-
oped by trademark holders in the future, courts could require
intermediaries to implement those measures to avoid the im-
putation of constructive knowledge (subsection (b)).  Further-
more, rights holders can enforce any court orders obtained
against direct infringers (subsection (c)).  At the same time,
the rule affords considerable protection for Z-Bay in that it
would only be liable for facilitating activity that clearly violates
international norms.72  Further, this solves the logical problem
noted in connection with the conflicts rules in that it premises
secondary infringement liability on counterfeiting, and hence
on direct infringement.
A substantive international approach would not, however,
solve all of the problems for Z-Bay.  Had the Patrian and Xan-
dian courts operated under this rule, they could have still adju-
dicated the cases differently because they could have come to
differing conclusions on what level of knowledge is required
and what sorts of monitoring measures are feasible.  However,
it is to be hoped that over time, as decisions become accessible
throughout the world and as judicial networks evolve, out-
comes will converge.73  For example, national courts have in
large part acted consistently with the Joint Recommendation
on Internet Use on crafting relief in online cases.74
This approach would also leave some problems for rights
holders.  They would lose the option of using secondary in-
fringement as a mechanism for obtaining worldwide relief for
forms of infringement other than counterfeiting.  For exam-
ple, LuisV and Epiphany could not sue Z-Bay for facilitating
the sale of parallel imports.  Trademark holders are not, how-
72. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(A)-(B) (2009) (limiting the remedies availa-
ble to an owner of a trademark right when it is established that the violator is
an innocent infringer).
73. See Anne Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA.  J. INT’L L.
1103, 1124 (2000) (discussing the rise of networks of judges).
74. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp.
1032, 1036-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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ever, without their remedies.  In the short term, they can pur-
sue actions against direct infringers.  To the extent that these
infringements will likely qualify as ubiquitous, a small set of
laws will likely apply, making the case easier to litigate.  Since
the interests in developing new technology would not be at
issue, the classic trademark policy issues would be salient in
these actions.  Because subsection (c) is not restricted to coun-
terfeiting, a trademark holder could also force Z-Bay to re-
move from its website any goods that a court had found to be
infringing under national law, such as goods that the jurisdic-
tion regarded as not subject to exhaustion.  Complementary
measures could be taken to mitigate the remaining hardships
for rights holders.  For example, suits against direct infringers
would be more efficacious if the intermediaries engaged in
secondary infringement were required to provide information
about the use and users of their systems.75
IV. SITUATING THE PROPOSALS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
The three approaches discussed in the previous section
each contain innovations in the treatment of intermediary lia-
bility for trademark infringement in the global marketplace.
Each challenges the broader premises of the international in-
tellectual property regime.  Some echo other features of the
international system; others build and improve upon existing
practices.
A. ALI and CLIP Proposals
At present, most national courts will only permit consoli-
dation of copyright claims; trademark claims and—even more
so—patent claims must be litigated on a country-by-country
basis.  In all cases (including copyright), the resolution of
multi-state disputes depends on the application of multiple do-
mestic laws.  The ALI and CLIP proposals liberalize both as-
pects of the current system, permitting consolidation of all
kinds of intellectual property cases and allowing the applica-
tion of a single law in the case of ubiquitous infringement.
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2009) (requiring internet service providers to
supply information about the users of their systems); Council Directive
2004/48, art. 95, 2004 O.J. (L157) 45 (EC) (introducing a requirement to
provide information).
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These ideas are hardly radical.  The consolidation propos-
als build on recent developments in copyright law worldwide
and European efforts to provide a more efficient system for
enforcing patent rights.76  For example, a decade ago, the Sec-
ond Circuit approved the adjudication of eighteen different
national claims in a worldwide copyright licensing dispute.77
Likewise, the application of a single law to aspects of a
worldwide dispute, although hardly the norm, is not unknown.
In some instances, the application is (as previously noted) sub-
conscious.  Indeed, the French court in the LVMH v. eBay case,
which inspired the hypothetical, applied French law to world-
wide claims, albeit without considering the international
ramifications of its holding.  In other cases, courts readily lo-
calize international activity in the forum.  Internet cases are
particularly susceptible to this analysis because it is relatively
easy to conceptualize access as local conduct.78  However, in
some cases the approach represents implicit recognition that
the international marketplace requires the application of a sin-
gle law to particular issues.  For example, the Second Circuit
has effectively adopted something close to a lex originis ap-
proach to the question of initial ownership of copyrights (and
76. See Pearce v. Ove Arup Partnership, (2000) 3 W.L.R. 332 (Eng.); Fort
Dodge Animal Health v. Akzo Nobel, [1998] F.S.R. 222 (Eng.); Expandable
Grafts P’ship/Boston Scientific BV, Gerechtshof [Hof] [Court of Appeal],
Den Haag, 23 April 1998, 1999 F.S.R. 352 (Neth.). But see Case C-4/03, GAT
v. LuK, OJ C 224 (Sept 16, 2006) 1 (ECJ 2006); Case C-539/03, Roche Ne-
derland v. Primus, OJ C 224, 2006 ECJ 1 (Sept. 16, 2006); Voda v. Cordis
Corp., 486 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Lucasfilms Limited v. Ainsworth,
[2009] EWCA Civ. 1328 (Dec. 16, 2009).
77. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145
F.3d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1998).
78. See Playboy, 939 F. Supp. at 1032 (finding that allowing access from
the United States to images on defendant’s web site hosted in Italy violated a
1981 injunction against the company from publishing and distributing
images in the United States); Nat’l Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint
Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 10 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that, even though the
broadcast signal had been retransmitted and broadcast in Canada, defen-
dant was still liable for copyright infringement because the signal had origi-
nally been captured in the United States); Soc’y of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Ass’n of Internet Providers, [2004] 2
S.C.R. 427, 432, 2004 SCC 45 (Can.) (ruling that the Copyright Act of Ca-
nada applies so long as there is a real and substantial connection with Ca-
nada).
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thus applied a single law to the question of ownership world-
wide).79
B. The Autonomous Tort Approach to Choice of Law
The debate over choice of law in online intellectual prop-
erty disputes is characterized by concerns over “information
havens” and “information hells.”  The concern is that a coun-
try with lax protection will use the inevitable happenstance of
effects within its borders to enable worldwide unauthorized
distribution of protected material, or that a state with over-
broad rules will take advantage of the same phenomenon to
restrict uses that other states would regard as permissible.  The
ALI and CLIP largely address this problem through rules on
personal jurisdiction.  The autonomous tort approach to
choice of law provides a new lever in the context of in-
termediaries.  Trademark owners can sue direct infringers
under laws congenial to their interests.  On the other hand, by
situating themselves in countries that are hospitable to techno-
logical and business innovation, intermediaries enhance the
probability that their conduct will be assessed under rules
more favorable to them.  This enables them to offer an effi-
cient mechanism for global trade.  The result “splits the baby”:
neither the information haven nor the information hell can
dominate the world market.  The approach thus vindicates
concerns for national autonomy.  Regulatory diversity also pro-
motes another form of technological innovation: by allowing
states to recognize claims that require intermediaries to adopt
novel enforcement tools, regulatory diversity encourages inno-
vations in compliance mechanisms.  Both the ideas of national
autonomy and the role of nations as laboratories are compo-
nents of the classical intellectual property system.
The autonomous tort approach advances the private in-
ternational law of intellectual property by engaging with con-
temporary conflicts scholarship.  In particular, its regard for
the different substantive purposes of primary and secondary
infringement law takes into account the lessons of interest
79. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82
(2d Cir. 1998).  The ALI adopts a similar approach, especially in copyright.
See ALI Principles, § 313.
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analysis and functionalism,80 a process to some extent started
by the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Rus-
sian Courier.81  A formalistic application of lex loci protectionis,
which flows from strict adherence to the traditional intellec-
tual property principle of territoriality, fails to grapple explic-
itly with the problems of overlapping authority in today’s
world.82  Modern conflicts scholars recognize that choice of
law questions involve balancing the competing interests of
states.83
80. The tests developed by courts in the United States to determine the
potential extra-territorial application of U.S. trademark law in transborder
cases have long purported to have regard for the interests of other states.
See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285–86 (1952); Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).  In recent cases,
some courts have stressed the importance of viewing such questions with an
eye to the substantive purposes of trademark law. See McBee v. Delica Co.
417 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that in order for a plaintiff to
reach foreign activities of foreign defendants in American courts, the “com-
plained-of activities [must] have a substantial effect on United States com-
merce, viewed in light of the purposes of the Lanham Act.”). See generally
Dinwoodie, supra note 54.  These tests, which more closely resemble the ap-
proach of §§ 402-403 of the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
than the Second Restatement of Conflicts, have not, however, given rise to
particularly nuanced analysis by trademark courts.
81. 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).  The Second Circuit’s reliance on the
Second Restatement of Conflicts, id. at 90, to develop a copyright choice of
law rule as a matter of federal law inevitably injected some contemporary
conflicts material into its statement of the rule it adopted.  The court thus
referred to an “‘interest’ approach,” id. at 91, and the law of the state with
“the most significant relationship” to the property and the parties, id. at 90.
However, the application of those concepts remained wooden, unlike the
more nuanced regard for underlying state interests found in (the better)
judicial explorations of the Second Restatement.
82. See, e.g., Rome II Regulation, supra note 42 (largely endorsing the lex
loci protectionis).  For a discussion of the problems with strict application of lex
loci protectionis, see MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND
RELATED RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEX PROTECTIONIS 105-10 (2003).
83. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET. AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 43-68 (4th ed. 2004)
(discussing analysis of state interests in contemporary conflicts law). See gen-
erally ARTHUR VON MEHREN & DONALD TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS (1965).  For a list of the factors relevant to the choice of applica-
ble rule of law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6
(1971). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-403 (1987) (noting factors relevant to the deter-
mination of an unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe law).
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C. The Substantive Approach to Secondary Liability
While the two prior approaches, which are based on pri-
vate international law, ameliorate some of the problems of ter-
ritoriality in a global marketplace, they do not ensure an opti-
mal scope of liability for intermediaries that operate world-
wide.  Diverse national laws will continue to determine the
values according to which the conduct of intermediaries will
be judged.84  In contrast, articulating a substantive interna-
tional approach will erase the potential for intermediaries to
be governed by divergent norms, thereby creating a global
standard.  The global standard proposed above reconnects pri-
mary and secondary liability, which is regarded by many as a
logical imperative.  It also gives technological innovators room
to experiment, gives rights holders incentives to invent compli-
ance mechanisms, and enables the development of efficient
global markets without disregarding the core objectives of na-
tional trademark rights.  As such, it is fully consistent with the
stated purposes of the TRIPS Agreement.
Another way to conceptualize the substantive approach is
as setting a ceiling on the scope of protection permitted under
the TRIPS Agreement.  Because TRIPS is a minimum-rights re-
gime and—like the previous international conventions—in-
cludes very few mandatory limitations,85 it is largely regarded
as a one-way ratchet.  It permits nations to continually expand
their own intellectual property rights and to extract commit-
ments from other countries to do likewise in bilateral trade
agreements.  For example, in a Free Trade Agreement with
Australia, the United States has succeeded in destroying the
flexibilities TRIPS provides on the question of exhaustion.86
84. Moreover, the ability of Z-Bay to ensure the application of Xandian
law to its activities under our autonomous tort approach might be affected
by whether a Patrian trademark owner is able to frame a claim in a way that
concentrates the contacts with its place of residence, allowing a Patrian (or
another) court room to find Patrian law applicable even under our pro-
posed choice of law rule.
85. See, e.g., Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3.
86. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17,
May 18, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file469_5141.pdf.  In a way, that
agreement aims at doing some of what trademark holders are seeking in the
eBay cases: limiting the scope of the secondary market in trademark goods.
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The substantive approach, which limits secondary liability for
the resale of legitimate goods, is a counterweight to these ef-
forts.  Discussions of international ceilings are ongoing in a
number of fora;87 this proposal advances these efforts in a
nuanced way.  In exchange for limiting the exposure of in-
termediaries to secondary liability, it strengthens the mecha-
nism for enforcing agreed norms against counterfeiting.  It im-
poses a global norm with respect to global intermediaries, but
reserves some area of local autonomy for dealing with direct
infringers.
V. CONCLUSION
Fifteen years ago, the TRIPS Agreement put intellectual
property front and center in the development of global trade.
No sooner was the ink dry, than it became clear that a genuine
global market in knowledge products would be heavily depen-
dent on digital communication technologies—information
conduits, methodologies for exchanging content (be it schol-
arly, entertaining, or political), venues that bring geographi-
cally diverse parties together to share common interests, ser-
vices that facilitate commercial transactions.  Protecting these
internet service providers (such as AOL and universities), peer
to peer file sharing facilities (such as SSRN), web hosting ser-
vices (TWEN), search engines (Google), data aggregators (Ya-
hoo! News), chat rooms (lawProf), social networking cites
(Facebook), and auction sites (eBay) has become a precondi-
tion to the rich and vibrant “knowledge economy” in which we
now operate.
States typically will have diverse views on how to adapt
long-held values to the new environment.  Xandia may want to
foster the dynamism of this marketplace by giving latitude to
these online entrepreneurs.  Yet, Patria could have a more
static vision, one that sees a more prominent role for tradi-
tional intellectual property interests.  Under traditional princi-
ples, mediating these differences presents apparently intracta-
ble dilemmas for trans-border intellectual property litigation.
87. See, e.g., P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT
35-49 (2008), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/limitations_ex-
ceptions_copyright.pdf (recommending a global instrument on limitations
and exceptions in the international copyright system).
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However, the silver lining might be that it has forced intellec-
tual property law to confront the complexity of private interna-
tional law.
The paper has explored the strengths and weaknesses of
private international law as a means for solving the problems
posed by the global online marketplace.  It has also demon-
strated that even with a well-developed private international
law, some matters might benefit from the adoption of substan-
tive international norms.  As Andy Lowenfeld has long in-
sisted, a full understanding of the international system needs
to take account of both.  It must temper strong calls to sover-
eignty (what intellectual property law calls territoriality) to
achieve the benefits of a truly global society.
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